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Steed v. Imperial Airlines
On October 31, 1973, the Supreme Court of California, sitting
in bank, handed down the opinion of the case of Steed v. Imperial
Airlines.' The holding of the court in that case was: "[T]hat
the word 'heirs' as used in California Code of Civil Procedure. sec-
tion 377 includes within its meaning a dependent stepchild such
as Elizabeth under the circumstances of this case."'2 It is with
this holding and the difference between the analysis of the majority
and the dissent, that this casenote deals.
California Code of Civil Procedure section 377 is the California
code section which provides for an action for wrongful death by
certain designated classes.3 Under this section, the wrongful death
action may be brought by the decedent's heirs, personal representa-
tives, or dependent parents. It was pursuant to this code section
that the action in the case under discussion was brought.
The action was brought by Martha Steed as guardian ad litem
for her daughter Elizabeth against Imperial Airlines, Volpar, Inc.,
Visco Flying Co., and Garrett Air Research for the wrongful death
of Elizabeth's stepfather, Ronald Steed. Defendant Garrett's mo-
tion for summary judgment was granted by the trial court on
the ground that Elizabeth was not an "heir" of her stepfather and
thus had no right of action under California Code of Civil Pro-
cedure section 377. Plaintiff appealed from the decision of the trial
court.
On April 8, 1959, Elizabeth was born to Martha out of wedlock.
On April 25, 1962, Martha married Ronald Steed who was not the
natural father of Elizabeth. Prior to the marriage, Ronald orally
agreed to assume the full obligation of father and parent to Eliza-
beth. From the date of his marriage to Martha, Ronald held out
Elizabeth to all the world as his daughter. This holding out con-
tinued until the date of his death which was January 8, 1968. The
holding out by Ronald consisted of his accepting her into his home,
* Ed. note: The California Supreme Court, on rehearing, reversed the
holding here, Steed v. Imperial Airlines - Cal. 3d -, 524 P.2d 801, 115
Cal. Rptr. 329 (July 25, 1974)).
1. Steed v. Imperial Airlines, 10 Cal. 3d 323, 515 P.2d 17, 110 Cal. Rptr.
217 (1973).
2. Id. at 330, 515 P.2d at 22, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
3. CAL. CODE OF CIv. PRoc. § 377 ('West 1973).
acquiescing in and encouraging the use of his surname by her, pro-
viding her with full support, and at all times representing to her
that he was in fact her father. These representations led Eliza-
beth into believing that Ronald was in fact her father. Ronald
claimed Elizabeth as a dependent on his tax returns and made no
demands on her natural father for contributions to her support.
However, Ronald never formally adopted Elizabeth. Ronald's na-
tural daughter recovered $75,000 for his death.
The issue before the court in this case, as framed by Mr. Justice
Burke, was: "[W] hether a stepchild, treated in all respects as the
natural child of her deceased stepfather, may maintain an action
for the wrongful death of the step-parent under Code of Civil Pro-
cedure section 377 which limits the right of action to 'heirs' or
'personal representatives.' ,4
It was the conclusion of the court that under the stipulated facts,
California Code of Civil Procedure section 377 must be interpreted
as allowing the action, in order to comply with the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.5
The reasoning of the majority, speaking through Mr. Justice
Burke, began with an interpretation -of the word "heirs" as used
in the code section. The court cited the case of Kunakoff v. Woods"
for the proposition that, the use of the word "heirs" in section
377 has been interpreted as limiting the class of persons to those
who would have inherited the decedent's estate had he died intes-
tate.7 There is no provision for inheritance by dependent stepchil-
dren in the California statutes of succession." Therefore, under
the interpretation advanced by the court, Elizabeth would be un-
able to maintain an action for the wrongful death of her stepfather.
In order 'the resolve the dilemma with which the court was faced
due to the past statutory construction, Mr. Justice Burke turned
to the principles of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. The analysis began
by setting forth two rules of equal protection. The first rule dis-
cussed by the analysis was that, distinctions drawn by a statute
4. Steed v. Imperial Airlines, 10 Cal. 3d 323, 325, 515 P.2d 17, 18, 110
Cal. Rptr. 217, 218 (1973).
5. Id. at 325, 515 P.2d at 18, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
6. Kunakoff v. Woods, 166 Cal. App. 2d 59, 62, 332 P.2d 773, 775
(1958).
7. Steed v. Imperial Airlines, 10 Cal. 3d 323, 326, 515 P.2d 17, 19, 110
Cal. Rptr. 217, 219 (1973).
8. Id. at 326, 515 P.2d at 19, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
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granting an economic benefit to one class while denying it to an-
other class, must bear at least some rational relationship to a con-
ceivable state purpose." In addition, the analysis discussed the rule
that, a statute which is valid on its face may have a discrimina-
tory effect in its application thereby denying equal protection of
the law.' 0 The majority opinion concluded that the statute met
the demands of the Equal Protection Clause on its face, and then
went on to test the constitutionality of the section in its applica-
tion."
The majority concluded that the code section violated the Equal
Protection Clause in its application to the facts of this case. The
fact that the code section would have the effect of excluding the
recovery of Elizabeth while allowing the recovery of the natural
child, led the court to hold that: "We can find no rational basis
for such a distinction which is based solely upon the technical defi-
nition of the word 'heirs.' 12 The reasoning of the court turned
upon the absence of distinguishable differences between collection
by Elizabeth 'and by her stepsister. Both children had relied upon
the deceased in the same way and for the same reasons. The fact
that the deceased had failed to formally adopt Elizabeth as being
the only obstacle to her recovery seemed repugnant to the court.
The court continued in its opinion by analogizing the facts before
it to the facts of two United States Supreme Court cases dealing
with the rights of illegitimate children as compared to those of legiti-
mate children. In Levy v. Louisiana3 the United States Supreme
Court held invalid under the Equal Protection Clause a Louisiana
statute which barred an action by illegitimate children for the
wrongful death of their mother. The majority of the court quoted
the following from the Levy decision:
These children, though illegitimate, were dependent on her; she
cared for them and nurtured them; they were indeed hers in the
biological and spiritual sense; in her death they suffered wrong
in the sense that any dependent would.14 [Italics added by the
court].
9. Id.
10. Id. at 327, 515 P.2d at 20, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
14. Steed v. Imperial Airlines, 10 Cal. 3d 323, 327, 515 P.2d 17, 20, 110
Cal. Rptr. 217, 220 (1973).
The opinion then goes on to quote from the case of Weber v.
Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.1"
An unacknowledged illegitimate child may suffer as much from
the loss of a parent as a child born within wedlock or an illegiti-
mate later acknowledged .. . The legitimate children and the il-
legitimate child all lived in the home of the deceased and were
equally dependent upon him for maintenance and support.'6
[Italics added by the court).
After discussing the opinions of the two cases, the court turned
to 'a case decided by the California Court of Appeal. In Arizmendi
v. System Leasing Corp.17 the Court of Appeal held that, a distinc-
tion under the California statutes, which prevent an unacknowl-
edged illegitimate child from bringing an action under California
Code of Civil Procedure section 377 for the wrongful death of his
father, constituted a denial of equal protection. 18 The court then
went on to quote further from the opinion where the Court of
Appeal said that, the deprivation of the right of support by the
tortious act of a third person resulting in the death of the natural
father is just as real and as devastating to an illegitimate minor
child as it is to a legitimate minor child.19
The court proceeded from their discussion of the cases above to
compare the status of Elizabeth to that of the children in the cases
cited. The court considered the relationship between Elizabeth and
Ronald, and concluded that although Elizabeth was not the nat-
ural child of the decedent, she was as dependent upon him for
support as were the children in Levy, Weber, and Arizmendi.20 The
court then went on to say that: "[T] he relationship between Eliza-
beth and the decedent was such that the decedent would have been
estopped, had he lived, from denying a continuing obligation to
support her."'2'
Relying on the language and discussion of the cases cited above,
and upon the estoppel decision, citing Clevenger v. Clevenger22 the
court concluded that the support of Elizabeth by the decedent ren-
dered the injury she suffered identical with that suffered by her
15. Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
16. Steed v. Imperial Airlines, 10 Cal. 3d 323, 328, 515 P.2d 17, 21, 110
Cal. Rptr. 217, 221 (1973).
17. Arizmendi v. System Leasing Corp., 15 Cal. App. 3d 720, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 411 (1971).
18. Steed v. Imperial Airlines, 10 Cal. 3d 323, 328, 515 P.2d 17, 21, 110
Cal. Rptr. 217, 221 (1973).
19. Id. at 328, 515 P.2d at 21, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Clevenger v. Clevenger, 189 Cal. App. 2d 658, 11 Cal. Rptr. 707
(1961).
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step-sister, who was allowed to recover under the code section.23
With this idea of identical loss of support due to the death of the
decedent, the court reasoned that there was no rational reason for
drawing a distinction between dependent stepchildren in Eliza-
beth's position and other dependent children, at least for the pur-
pose of maintaining a wrongful death action. "As in Levy, Weber,
and Arizmendi, supra, to deny the child's right to recover for her
loss would be an impermissible discrimination under the equal pro-
tection clause. '24
The court concluded by reversing and remanding the case to the
trial court with orders to deny the motion for summary judgment.
The express holding of the court which resulted in this determina-
tion expanded the interpretation of the word "heirs" as used in
the code section. The majority held that the word "heirs" as used
in California Code of Civil Procedure section 377 includes within
,its meaning a dependent stepchild such as Elizabeth under the cir-
cumstances of this case.25
It would appear that the court was limiting its holding to facts
identical with this case. When this holding was challenged by Mr.
'Chief Justice Wright, in his dissenting opinion, as, replacing the
class of persons limited to "heirs" with a class limited to those who
are injured by reason of the death of the decedent, thus markedly
'altering the legislative limitation,26 the majority answered by way
of a footnote to its opinion wherein it was said that:
We conclude merely that where two half sisters suffer an identical
injury because of their relationship to the deceased, there is no
rational distinction that could be drawn allowing recovery by one
but not by the other. Thus, to deny recovery to Elizabeth, but
not to her half sister, solely upon a technical, albeit correct, legal
definition of the word 'heirs' contravenes the mandate of the
Equal Protection Clause.27
Mr. Chief Justice Wright went on in his dissenting opinion to
state his interpretation of the majority opinion, as a case of distilla-
tion from Code of Civil Procedure section 377 a legislative purpose
23. Steed v. Imperial Airlines, 10 Cal. 3d 323, 330, 515 P.2d 17, 22, 110
Cal. Rptr. 217, 222 (1973).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 331, 515 P.2d at 23, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
27. Id.
to compensate those in a position of dependency for the injury
or pecuniary losses they would suffer by reason of the death of
the individual who had furnished support.28 The dissenting jus-
tice seemed to be of the belief that, the legislature had foreclosed
the need for the court to construct the language of the code section
by the use of clear language in defining the scope of the code sec-
tion.
The word 'heirs' does not require construction but, apparently
recognizing that it does not, the majority seek to substitute for
such legislatively declared class of persons an indefinite and,
depending upon the circumstances of each case, a varying class
consisting of persons, who, because of some dependency status are
injured by decedent's death.29
The majority answered the dissent, again by footnote, and
stressed the equal protection principle upon which the opinion was
based. The majority felt that the dissent had assumed that since
the classification was intended by the legislature, that it was there-
fore proper. This, said the court, wholly disregards the contempo-
rary function of the Equal Protection Clause as a limitation upon
the types of permissible legislative classifications.30
The recent trend of the courts around the country in cases in-
volving the rights of illegitimates under the Equal Protection
Clause has been to bring some sort of uniformity into the law by
doing away with classifications which are held over from the
common law.31 Just as the courts have concluded that there is
no rational state interest furthered by the classification of illegiti-
mates as second class citizens when compared to legitimate chil-
dren,3 2 it is now time for the same reasoning to apply to non-
adopted step-children, when compared to the natural children of
a step-parent.
The majority opinion in this case, when viewed along with the
current trend of the law, is a step in the right direction. Us-
ing the principles of the Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme
Court of California, has by this opinion, opened the door for even-
tual determination that, any person who suffers loss of support
by reason of the wrongful death of another, should be able to re-
cover for their loss under the state's wrongful death statute. The
trend in this direction is evidenced not only by this case, but by
the act of the California legislature in amending section 377 in 1968
28. Id. at 333, 515 P.2d 24, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 224.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 331, 515 P.2d at 23, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
31. 1 PEPPERDINEL. REV. 266 (1974).
32. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
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to include within that class of persons who may bring an action
for the wrongful death of another, dependent parents of the dece-
dent.3 3
The ramification of the majority's opinion has yet to be felt. The
limitation to the facts of the case before the court may result in
a case by case determination until such time as the court aban-
dons all restrictions as to who may bring an action under Cali-
fornia Code of Civil Procedure section 377.
In its final determination, the court looked to the case of Cleven-
ger v. Clevenger34 In that case, the court held that under a lim-
ited set of circumstances a child's step-father would not be allowed
to assert that he was not the child's father to avoid paying child
support. The step-father was estopped to deny that he was the
child's father.35 The facts in the case gave rise to the action by
the child to collect support from his step-father. It would appear
that the support idea weighed heavily on the court's determination
in Clevenger, just as it did in the case under discussion.
The United States Supreme Court has looked to the support ele-
ment in its decisions concerning illegitimates. 36 The California Su-
preme Court in the case under discussion 'and in other cited cases
herein, has also relied on the element of support in reaching their
decisions.'? The apparent trend of both of these high courts is
to extend the right to maintain an action for wrongful death to
all persons who have suffered a loss of support by the death of
the decedent. Perhaps, one day, using the principles of the Four-
teenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, the courts will extend
this right to corporations and other entities considered "persons"
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The way is now open for the California Supreme Court to expand
the interpretation of the word "heirs" in section 377, to all persons
who have suffered loss by reason of the wrongful death of the
33. CAL. CODE OF CIV. PROC. § 377 (West Supp. 1974).
34. Clevenger v. Clevenger, 189 Cal. App. 2d 658, 11 Cal. Rptr. 707
(1961).
35. Id. at 671, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
36. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
37. Arizmendi v. Systems Leasing Corp., 15 Cal. App. 3d 730, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 411 (1971); Clevenger v. Clevenger, 189 Cal. App. 2d 658, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 707 (1961).
decedent. The restriction based on limiting recovery to relatives
of the decedent has been explained as necessary to eliminate diffi-
cult proof problems which might arise.8  Certainly, this parade
of the horribles argument should have no effect when faced with
important rights and the loss of support by reason of the wrongful
death of the decedent. The right to support, regardless of blood
relation to the decedent, has been shown to outweigh all proof
problems, by leaving the final determination of loss up to the court,
as was done in the case under discussion.
'CLAY PLOTKIN
38. Steed v. Imperial Airlines, 10 Cal. 3d 323, 327, 515 P.2d 17, 20, 110
Cal. Rptr. 217, 220 (1973).
